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Abstract—Robots interacting with the physical world plan
with models of physics. We advocate that robots interact-
ing with people need to plan with models of cognition.
This writeup summarizes the insights we have gained in
integrating computational cognitive models of people into
robotics planning and control. It starts from a general game-
theoretic formulation of interaction, and analyzes how dif-
ferent approximations result in different useful coordination
behaviors for the robot during its interaction with people.
I. Introduction
Robots act to maximize their utility. They reason about
how their actions affect the state of the world, and try to
find the actions which, in expectation, will accumulate as
much reward as possible. We want robots to do this well
so that they can be useful to us – so that they can come
in support of real people. But supporting people means
having to work with and around them. We, the people,
are going to have to share the road with autonomous
cars, share our kitchens with personal robots, share our
control authority with prosthetic and assistive arms.
Sharing is not easy for the robots of today. They know
how to deal with obstacles, but people are more than
that. We reason about the robot, we make decisions, we
act. This means that the robot needs to make predictions
about what we will think, want, and do, so that it can
figure out actions that coordinate well with ours and that
are helpful to us. Much like robots of today have a theory
of physics (be it explicitly as an equation or implicitly as
a learned model), the robots of tomorrow will need to
start having a theory of mind.
Our work for the past few years has focused on
integrating mathematical theories of mind, particularly
about human future actions and beliefs, into the way
robots plan their physical, task-oriented actions.
This required a change from the robotics problem
formulation (Fig.1, left), to an interaction problem for-
mulation (Fig.1, right). Interaction means there is not a
single agent anymore: the robot and human are both
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Fig. 1: Left: Traditional robotics formalism: the robot takes actions uR to
optimize a reward or cost function rR. Right: Interaction formalism: the
robot is not acting in isolation; the human takes actions uH to optimize
a reward function rH , possibly different from that of the robot’s, and
parametrized by human internal/hidden state θH ; the human does
not know the robot internal state θR, which parametrizes the robot’s
reward function; and both functions depend on both agents’ actions.
agents in a two player game, and they take actions
according to utility functions that are not necessarily
identical or known to each other. The paper outlines this
formally in Sec. II, and then summarizes the different
approximations we’ve explored and what we’ve learned
from them [3, 6–10, 12–14, 19–21, 24]:
Accounting for the physical human behavior during
interaction (Sec. III).
One important insight for us has been that people
can’t be treated as just obstacles that move: they will
react to what the robot does.
If a car starts merging in front of you, you break. If the
robot helping you assemble a part employs a different
strategy than you expected, you adapt. It took more and
more sophisticated approximations to the game above to
account for this.
Our first approximation to the game started by as-
suming a shared utility function and treating the person
as a perfect collaborator, but replanning at every step
to adapt to when the person deviates from the collab-
orative plan [13]; we then relaxed this to an imperfect
collaborator model, showing that the robot can leverage
its actions to guide the person to perform better in the
task [3]; finally, we investigated a model of the person
as optimizing a different utility function, but simply
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computing a best response to the robot’s actions (as
opposed to solving the full dynamic game) [20] – this
model enables the robot to account for how people will
react to its actions, and thus perform better at its task.
Using the human behavior to infer human internal
states (Sec. IV). The models above were a first step in
coordinating with people, but they were disappointing
in that they still assumed perfect information, i.e. ev-
erything is known to both parties. It is simply not true
that we will be able to give our robots up front a perfect
model of each person they will interact with. Next, we
studied how robots might be able to estimate internal,
hidden, human states, online, by taking human behavior
into account as evidence about them.
Another important insight has been that robots
should not take their objective functions for granted:
they are easy to misspecify and change from person
to person. Instead, robots should optimize for what
the person wants internally, and use human guid-
ance to estimate what that is.
Inverse Reinforcement Learning [15, 17, 25] already
addresses this for a passive observer analyzing offline
human demonstrations of approximately optimal behavior
in isolation. Our work builds on three goals: 1) making
these inferences actively and online; we leverage not just
queries [21], but also the robot’s physical actions [19]; 2)
accounting for the fact that if the person knows the robot
is trying to learn, they will act differently from what
they do in isolation and teach [9]; and, perhaps most
importantly, 3) leveraging richer sources of human be-
havior beyond demonstrations, like physical corrections
[1], orders given to the robot [14], and even the reward
function specified [10] – all of these are observations
about the actual desired reward.
We argue that interpreting the reward function de-
signed for the robot as useful information about the true
desired reward, by leveraging the context in which this
function was designed to begin with, can make robots
less sensitive to negative consequences of misspecified
rewards [10]. Similarly, we find that interpreting orders
as useful information about the desired reward give
robots a provable incentive to accept human oversight
as opposed to bypass it in pursuit of some misspecified
objective [8]. Overall, we find that accepting that the
robot’s reward function is not given, but part of the
person’s internal state, is key to safe and customizable
robots.
Accounting for human beliefs about robot internal
states (Sec. V).
Robots need to make inferences about people during
interaction, but people, too, need to make inferences
about robots. Robot actions influence whether people
can make the correct inferences.
The third part of our work focuses on getting robots to
produce behavior that enables these human inferences
to happen correctly, whether they are about the robot’s
behavior [7], or about the robot’s internal states (like
utility [12], goals [6], or even level of uncertainty [24]).
Although these increases the robot’s transparency, we
have been encoding the need for that in the objective
directly, whereas really it should be a consequence of
solving the interaction problem well. This is something
we are actively looking into, but which increases the
computational burden.
All this research stands on the shoulders of inspiring
works in computational human-robot interaction, nicely
summarized in sections 6 and 7 of [23] and not repeated
here. What this writeup contributes a summary of our
own experiences in this area, particularly focusing on
physical, task-oriented interaction. It provides a common
formalism that, in retrospect, can be seen as the general
formulation that seeded these works, along with a quasi-
systematic analysis of the different ways to approximate
solutions and the sometimes surprisingly interesting and
powerful behavior that emerges when we do that. This
enables robots to tractably and autonomously generate dif-
ferent kinds of behavior for interaction, often in spite of
the continuous state and action spaces they have to handle –
from arms that guide and improve human performance
in handovers, to cars that negotiate at intersections,
to robots that purposefully make their inner-workings
more transparent to their end-users.
II. General Interaction as a Game
In general, we can formulate interaction as a 2-player
dynamic game between the human and the robot. The
state x contains the world state along with the robot and
human state:
x = (xW , xR, xH)
Each agent can take actions, and each agent has a
(potentially different) reward function:
rR(x, uR, uH; θR)
for the robot and
rH(x, uR, uH; θH)
for the human, each with parameters θ. The two do
not necessarily know each other’s reward functions (or
equivalently, each other’s parameters θ).
Let T be the time horizon, and uR and uH be a robot
and human, respectively, control sequence of length T.
We denote by RR the cumulative reward to the robot
Time to Complete the Task User Preference
Fig. 2: The Human as a Collaborator: On online study on collaborative Traveling Salesman Problems. The robot models the person’s behavior
as rational w.r.t. to the same reward function as its own reward function. In the "Fixed" condition, the robot plans an optimal centralized plan
for both the human and the robot, and executes its portion. If the human has a different plan, they end up needing to adapt. In the "Reactive"
condition, the robot adapts its plan after every target the human reaches, recomputing the new optimal centralized plan from that new state. This
performs significantly better than the human plan in objective and subjective task performance measures. Finally, in the "Predictive" condition,
the robot uses Bayesian Inference to predict the human’s next target via an observation model based on the rationality assumption, and can
proactively replan before the human reaches their target.
from the starting state x0:
RR(x0, uR, uH; θR) =
T
∑
t=0
rR(xt, utR, u
t
H; θR)
and by RH the cumulative reward for the human:
RH(x0, uR, uH; θH) =
T
∑
t=0
rH(xt, utR, u
t
H; θH)
One way to model what the person will do is to model
them as rationally solving this game. There are several
issues with this. The first is that it is computationally
intractable. The second is that if rH 6= rR, the game will
have many equilibria, so even if we could compute all
of them we’d still not be sure which the person is using.
The third is that even without the first two issues, this
would still not be a good model for how people make
decisions in day to day tasks [11, 18].
Our work has thus explored different approximations
to this problem that might better match what people do,
while enabling robots to actually generate their actions
in realistic tasks in (close to) real time.
III. Human Behavior During Interaction
Because in interaction the robot’s reward depends on
what the person does, the ability to anticipate human ac-
tions becomes crucial in deciding what the robot should
do. Rather than modeling the person as solving the game
above, we explored several approximations that each led
to different yet useful behaviors in interaction.
The Perfect Collaboration Model. The easiest simplify-
ing assumption is actually that the person is optimizing
the same reward function:
rH = rR
and both agents know this (no more partial information).
This assumption turns planning for interaction into a
much easier problem, analogous to the original robotics
problem: it is pretending like the person is just some
additional degrees of freedom that the robot can actuate
– their actions will follow the optimal centralized plan:
(u∗R, u
∗
H) = argmax
uR ,uH
RR(x0, uR, uH)
Despite its simplicity, we have found that this can be
very useful so long as the robot replans at every time
step. People inevitably deviate from from the optimal
centralized plan even from the first step, ending up in
some new state – because they don’t actually optimize
the same reward, because they don’t know that the
robot is optimizing the same reward, or because they
are not perfect optimizers. But the robot can recompute
the centralized optimal plan from that new state, and
proceed with the first action from the new u∗H.
Fig.2 shows a comparison from [13] between a “Fixed”
robot strategy, where the robot executes the originally
planned u∗R regardless of what the person does, and a
“Reactive” strategy, in which the robot keeps updating
uR based on the new centralized optimal plan from the
current state at every step. Here, RH = RR and equates
to the total time to solve the task. We recruited 234
participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk who played
collaborative Traveling Salesman Problems with a robot
avatar in a within-subjects design that included a 3rd
condition, discussed later, and a randomized trial order.
We found that the Reactive condition led to the task
being completed significantly faster by the human-robot
team, and that participants preferred the Reactive robot
especially in the beginning.
Overall, online planning with a perfect collaborative model
of human behavior can be useful, already enabling the robot
to continually adapt to the person’s plan even though it does
not get it right a priori.
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(a)  R assumes global H; 
H chooses grasp myopically and 
incurs high cost at the goal
(b) Cost histogram of H’s choices; 
the best myopic choice 
has high global cost
(c) R assumes myopic H; 
H chooses grasp myopically but 
still incurs low cost at the goal
(d) Cost histogram of H’s choices; 
the best myopic choice 
also has low global cost
Fig. 3: People can be myopic about their decision, greedily optimizing reward as opposed to looking ahead (a), e.g. choosing the most comfortable
way to grab a mug even though it they would have to regrasp it in order to set it down in a shelf. This might mean that the best action locally
has poor reward globally (b). When accounting for human myopia, the robot can select actions such that the myopic response is still good
globally (c,d).
Collaborative but Approximately Optimal. An im-
provement upon the perfectly rational collaborator hu-
man model is to recognize that people are not actually
perfectly rational. In [3], we model people as collab-
orative still, but no longer assume u∗H is perfect. In
particular, we assumed that people are greedy or myopic
in their decisions. Their action at time t will be the one
that looks locally good, not the one that is optimal over
the full time horizon:
ut∗H(u
t
R) = arg max
utH
rR(xt, utR, u
t
H)
The robot can then choose its own actions such that,
when coupled with the person’s myopic response to
them, the combined plan is as high-reward as possible:
u∗R = arg maxuR
RR(x0, uR, u∗H(uR))
This results in the robot guiding the person’s actions,
helping them overcome cognitive, bounded-rationality
limitations as much as possible.
Interaction becomes an underactuated system: the robot
no longer assumes it can directly actuate uH, but ac-
counts for how uR will influence uH and takes that into
account when planning.
In particular, we investigated a handover task in which
participants had to take an object from the robot and
place it at a goal location. We used as rH = rR as
negative ergonomic cost to the person. People’s decision
in this problem is how to take the object such that it
is ergonomically low cost. The robot’s decision is how
to hold the object at the handover time to enable that.
A perfect human optimizer would minimize cost at the
handover and at the goal. Our myopic model minimized
cost the handover time, which then could in some cases
resulted in high cost at the goal, such as needing to twist
their arm in an uncomfortable way. or regrasp. Fig.3
shows an example.
When the robot optimizes for its actions, it chooses
ways to hold the object that incentivize good global
human plans. The robot chooses grasps such that even
when the person chooses their grasp greedily for the
handover, that greedy grasp is also as close as possible to
the global optimum, resulting in low cost (high reward)
at the goal as well (Fig.3).
Overall, planning with a myopic collaborative model of the
human behavior results in the robot taking actions that can
guide the person towards plans that are globally optimal, help-
ing them overcome the limitations of greedy action selection.
Non-Collaborative but Computing a Best Response to
the Robot. Not every situations is collaborative. Take
driving for example. The car has the same objective as
its passenger, but a different objective from other human
driven vehicles on the road – these are trying to reach
their own destinations as efficiently as possible, and that
sometimes competes with the car’s objective.
Breaking the collaboration assumption that the human
is optimizing the same reward function as the robot (or
viceversa), puts making prediction of human behavior
back to solving a 2-player game even if we assume
known reward parameters. In [20], we introduced a
model that alleviates this difficulty by assuming that the
person is not computing to a Nash equilibrium, but in-
stead computing a best response to the robot’s plan using
a different, yet known reward function rH. That is, rather
than trying to influence the robot’s behavior, the person
is taking the robot’s behavior as fixed, and optimizing
their own reward function within that constraint:
u∗H(uR) = arg maxuH
RH(x0, uR, uH)
The robot can then compute the action sequence that,
when combined with the human’s response to that se-
quence, leads to the highest value for its own reward:
u∗R = arg maxuR
RR(x0, uR, u∗H(uR))
It can then take the first action in uR, observe the change
in the world, and replan. This is what we did in the
collaborative replanning case with the Reactive robot,
except now the robot has a model for how the person
will respond to its actions as opposed to computing a
joint global plan.
We applied this to autonomous driving, namely the
interaction between an autonomous car and a human-
driven vehicle. Both the robot and the person want to
achieve their goal efficiently, which made their reward
functions non-identical. We gave the robot access to RH
by learning it offline using IRL.
Typically in autonomous driving, cars treat people
like obstacles, planning to stay out of their way. This
leads to overly conservative behavior, like cars never
getting to merge on a highway, or getting stuck at 4-
way stops. In contrast, our car coordinates with people
(Fig.4). It sometimes plans to merge in front of them
knowing that they can slow down to accommodate the
merge. Or at an intersection, for RR being higher if the
person goes first through the intersection, the robot does
not just sit there, but coordinates by starting to back up,
which makes it safer for the person to go (effectively
signaling to the human driver). We ran a user study
with a driving simulator, and the results suggested that
people’s behavior when the robot is planning with this
model leads to significantly higher reward for the robot
than in the baseline of treating the person as on obstacle.
Overall, treating interaction as an underactuated system
where the person is not playing a game, but acting rationally
as a best response to the robot’s actions, leads to coordination
behavior that naturally emerges out of the optimization over
robot actions.
IV. Using Human Behavior
to Infer Human Internal State
Thus far we’ve oversimplified the game by assuming
that the robot knows the persons’s reward parameters.
In reality, the robot does have direct access to these.
Even further, we argue that in reality, the robot does not
really have access to its own reward parameters either
– collaborative robots, meant to help a person, should
optimize for whatever that person wants, not for some
a-priori determined reward function.
Robots today take their reward function as given. But
where does this reward function come from? Typically, it
is designed by some person who does their best at writ-
ing down what they think the robot should optimize for.
Unfortunately, we, people, are terrible at specifying what
we want. From King Midas to The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,
we have countless stories that warn us about unintended,
negative consequences of misspecified wishes or objec-
tives. We propose that robots should have uncertainty
over their objectives, and that they should try to optimize
for what people want internally, but can’t necessarily
explicate. This is key to alleviating the negative conse-
quences of a misspecified objective.
To achieve this, we use human actions as observations
about their internal or desired reward function. as they
would in the full dynamic game. But the robot will no
longer assume that it knows rH. However, if we assume
a rational model of human behavior, then the human
actions become observations about this hidden internal
human state. To estimate θH from human actions, the
robot needs an observation model – the probability of
observed actions given θH. We assume the person is
approximately rational [2, 25] with a model that comes
from a maximum entropy distribution in which trajecto-
ries are more likely when their total reward is higher:
P(uH|x0, uR, θH) ∝ exp(RH(x0, uR, uH; θH))
Then the robot can update its belief over θH:
b′(θH) ∝ b(θH)P(uH|x0, uR, θH)
If the robot observes a trajectory uH for the full time
horizon, then the belief update equates to (Bayesian)
Inverse Reinforcement Learning [17, 25].
But robots sometimes need to infer the human reward
online, as the human trajectory is unfolding. Think
back to the driving application: it is not the case that
every person optimizes the same reward function: some
drivers are more aggressive than others, some are not
paying attention, and so on. It is therefore helpful to
be able to update θ as the robot is interacting with the
person. In such cases, the robot has only observed u0:tH
and must update its belief based just that, rather than a
full trajectory.
Further, robots have an opportunity to go beyond
passive inference, and use their actions for active esti-
mation, triggering informative human reactions. Instead
of passively observing what people do, they can leverage
their actions to gather information.
Finally, it’s not just human physical actions that are
informative. Human behavior in general, like physical
corrections, comparisons, orders given to the robot, and
even a reward function that a designer tries to write
down – all of these are useful sources of information
about what the true robot objective should be.
Online Inference by Integrating over Futures. In [5, 13],
we integrated over the possible future human trajectories
in order to compute the belief update:
P(u0:tH |x0, uR, θH) =
∫
P(uH|x0, uR, θH)dut+1:TH
We showed that for the case of the reward rH being
parametrized by which goal θH the person is reach-
ing for, the integral can be approximated via Laplace’s
method, assuming reward 0 for trajectories that do not
reach the goal.
(a)  Treating the Human 
as a Dynamic Obstacle
(b) Planning in the 
Underactuated System
(c) The Robot Inches Backwards
 to Get the Human to Cross First
(d) User Study: The Robot Does Affect 
the Human’s Speed as Predicted
dyn. obstacle
underactuated
ideal modelF(1,160)=228.54p<.0001
Fig. 4: Coordination behavior emerges out of not treating people like obstacles that are moving, but modeling how they will rationally react to
robot actions.
Fig.2 shows a Predictive condition from [13], in which
the robot infers the person’s goal and uses it to proac-
tively change its plan. This condition outperforms the
Reactive condition. In [5], we used goal inference to
adapt to an operator’s goal during teleoperation of a
robot arm.
Overall, human actions as observations about the under-
lying human goals, and inferring these enables robots to
proactively adapt to what people want.
Active Online Inference using Robot Physical Ac-
tions. Inference does not have to be passive. In [21],
we explored active inference, where the robot makes
queries that the person responds to. But really, having a
robot whose actions influence human behavior presents
an opportunity: to leverage robot actions and trigger
informative human reactions.
In [19], we ran online inference by modeling the hu-
man as optimizing with a shorter time horizon. We then
took the human (short time horizon) trajectory as evi-
dence about the underlying θH. There, θH parametrized
the reward function by representing weights on different
important features of the human state and action. Unlike
goals, this is a continuous and high-dimensional space.
So rather than maintaining a belief over all possible θHs,
we clustered users into styles and only maintained a
belief over a discrete set of driving styles.
Further, we sped up the inference by leveraging the
robot’s actions: since the person will choose actions that
depend on what the robot does, uR, the robot has an
opportunity to select actions that maximize information
gain (trading off with maximizing reward using the
current estimate θˆH:
u∗R = arg maxuR
RR(x0, uR, u∗H(uR; ˆθH))
+λ(H(b)−EθHH(b′))
Note that if we were able to treat θH as the hidden
state in a POMDP with very complicated dynamics
(that require planning for the person to solve for how
the state will update given the robot’s action), then
the robot’s policy would achieve an optimal trade-off
between exploiting current information and gathering
information. However, since even POMDPs with less
complex dynamics are still intractable in continuous
state and action, we resorted to an explicit trade-off.
We found that the robot planning in this formula-
tion exhibited interesting behavior that could be seen
as information-gathering. For instance, it would nudge
closer to someone’s lane, because the anticipated reaction
from the person would be different depending on their
driving style: attentive drivers break, distracted drivers
continue. Or, at a 4-way stop, it would inch forward into
the intersection, again anticipating different reactions for
different styles.
The robot can leverage its actions’ influence on the person
to actively gather information about their internal reward
parameters.
What If the Human Knows the Robot is Learning?.
One issue with estimation arises when the observation
model is wrong. People might act approximately optimal
with respect to the reward function, except when they
know that the robot is trying to learn something from
them. This is why coaches are different from experts:
when we teach, we simplify, we exaggerate, we show-
case. A gymnastics coach does not demonstrate the same
action they would perform if they were in the olympics.
In [9], we analyzed the difference between maximizing
the reward function for the true θ∗H:
uexpertH = arg maxuH
RH(x0, uR, uH; θ∗H)
and maximizing the probability that the robot will infer
the true θ∗H:
uteacherH = arg maxuH
b′(θ∗H) = arg maxuH
P(θ∗H|x0, uR, uH)
Expert Demonstration Instructive Demonstration
Figure 1: The difference between demonstration-by-expert and instructive demonstration in the
mobile robot navigation problem from Section 4. Left: The ground truth reward function. Lighter
grid cells indicates areas of higher reward. Middle: The demonstration trajectory generated by the
expert policy, superimposed on the maximum a-posteriori reward function the robot infers. The robot
successfully learns where the maximum reward is, but little else. Right: An instructive demonstration
generated by the algorithm in Section 3.4 superimposed on the maximum a-posteriori reward function
that the robot infers. This demonstration highlights both points of high reward and so the robot learns
a better estimate of the reward.
for H. As a result, many IRL algorithms can be derived as state estimation for a best response to
different ⇡H, where the state includes the unobserved reward parametrization ✓.
Ng & Russell (2000), Abbeel & Ng (2004), and Ratliff et al. (2006) compute constraints that
characterize the set of reward functions so that the observed behavior maximizes reward. In general,
there will be many reward functions consistent with this constraint. They use a max-margin heuristic
to select a single reward function from this set as their estimate. In CIRL, the constraints they compute
characterizeR’s belief about ✓ under the DBE assumption.
Ramachandran & Amir (2007) and Ziebart et al. (2008) consider the case where ⇡H is “noisily
expert,” i.e., ⇡His a Boltzmann distribution where actions or trajectories are selected in proportion
to the exponent of their value. Ramachandran & Amir (2007) adopt a Bayesian approach and place
an explicit prior on rewards. Ziebart et al. (2008) places a prior on reward functions indirectly by
assuming a uniform prior over trajectories. In our model, these assumptions are variations of DBE
and both implement state estimation for a best response to the appropriate fixedH.
Natarajan et al. (2010) introduce an extension to IRL whereR observes multiple actors that cooperate
to maximize a common reward function. This is a different type of cooperation than we consider,
as the reward function is common knowledge andR is a passive observer. Waugh et al. (2011) and
Kuleshov & Schrijvers (2015) consider the problem of inferring payoffs from observed behavior in a
general (i.e., non-cooperative) game given observed behavior. It would be interesting to consider an
analogous extension to CIRL, akin to mechanism design, in whichR tries to maximize collective
utility for a group ofHs that may have competing objectives.
Fern et al. (2014) consider a hidden-goal MDP, a special case of a POMDP where the goal is an
unobserved part of the state. This can be considered a special case of CIRL, where ✓ encodes a
particular goal state. The frameworks share the idea thatR helpsH. The key difference between the
models lies in the treatment of the human (the agent in their terminology). Fern et al. (2014) model
the human as part of the environment. In contrast, we treatH as an actor in a decision problem that
both actors collectively solve. This is crucial to modeling the human’s incentive to teach.
Optimal Teaching. Because CIRL incentivizes the human to teach, as opposed to maximizing
reward in isolation, our work is related to optimal teaching: finding examples that optimally train
a learner (Balbach & Zeugmann, 2009; Goldman et al., 1993; Goldman & Kearns, 1995). The key
difference is that efficient learning is the objective of optimal teaching, while it emerges as a property
of optimal equilibrium behavior in CIRL.
Cakmak & Lopes (2012) consider an application of optimal teaching where the goal is to teach the
learner the reward function for an MDP. The teacher gets to pick initial states from which an expert
executes the reward-maximizing trajectory. The learner uses IRL to infer the reward function, and
the teacher picks initial states to minimize the learner’s uncertainty. In CIRL, this approach can be
characterized as an approximate algorithm forH that greedily minimizes the entropy ofR’s belief.
Beyond teaching, several models focus on taking actions that convey some underlying state, not
necessarily a reward function. Examples include finding a motion that best communicates an agent’s
intention (Dragan & Srinivasa, 2013), or finding a natural language utterance that best communicates
3
expert t acher
inferred reward inferred reward
high rewardlow reward
Fig. 5: We model teaching demonstrations as being informative about
the underlying reward function. An expert demonstration (left) might
lead to inferring the wrong reward function, e.g. because the expert
go s st aight for the high r ward peak nea by. A teaching demonstra-
tion will deviate from optimality to showcase the underlying reward
function, e.g. the teacher goes to both high reward peaks to clarify.
Fig.5 compares uexpertH to u
teacher
H in a simple MDP
where the reward function consists of high and low
reward peaks. The expert demonstration heads straight
to the closest high reward peak, but the robot has trouble
inferring th t there is another peak with also high re-
ward. In contrast, the teac ing demonstration visits both,
leading to the robot inferring the correct θH.
Overall, we should expect and account for how people will
act differently when they are trying to teach the robot about
their internal reward parameters.
Learning Objectives from Rich Human Guidance. It
is not just human physical actions as part of the task
that should inform the robot about the internal human
objective. We explored physical corrections [1] (Fig.6),
comparisons [21], orders (human oversight) [8, 14], and
even attempts at specifying an objective [10], all as
sources of information for the robot. Each required its
own observation model, and its own approximations for
running the inference.
In [10], we proposed to mode the reward design
process: the probability that a reward designer would
choose θR as the specified reward, given the true reward
θ∗ and the training environments they are considering.
We then showed how the robot can invert this model to
get a posterior istribution over what the true reward is,
and that this alleviates consequences like reward hacking
and egative side-effects. Surprisingly, we found that this
works even wh n the important features affecting the
true reward, like the presence of a dangerous kind of
terrain, are latent and not directly observed.
Even more surprising is our finding from [8], where
we focused on shut down orders to the robot. Intuitively,
robots should just follow such orders as opposed to try
to infer the underlying reward function that triggered
them. Unfortunately though, designing a reward func-
ti n that incentivize accepting ord rs is challenging,
and so is writing down the right hard co straints that
the robot should follow. Instead, our work has proved
that when the robot treats orders as a useful source of
information about its objective, the incentive to accept
Fig. 6: Learning the desired objective function from physical correc-
tions, in real-time, leads to completing the task in the desired way
with less human intervention.
them is positive.
Overall, we find that treating human guidance and over-
sight as a useful source of information about the robot’s
true reward can alleviate the unintended consequences of
misspecified robot reward functions.
V. Human Inferences about the Robot
The previous sections made approximations in which
the person knew everything they needed about the robot
– they were computing a best response to the robot
and got access to the robot’s planned trajectory uR.
Here, we relax this. Much like robots do not know
everything about people and make inferences about their
reward function or goals θH, people too will not know
everything about robots and will try to make similar
inferences when deciding on these actions.
Humans interacting with robots will have some belief
about θR. This section focuses on how robot actions
affect not just human actions, but also these human
beliefs. This means the robot can specifically choose
Fig. 7: After seeing the first t actions, the person should be able to
infer confidently the remaining ones. Imagine seeing the first step of
the most efficient plan, on the left. It is clear what the robot’s 2nd
action will be, but after that there are two courses that are relatively
close in efficiency. On the other hand, with the middle plan, the first
action only leaves one remaining plan sensible. It sacrifices efficiency
to make the final T-1 actions clear.
actions to guide these beliefs towards being as accurate
as possible, so that the human actions that follow are
well informed. These robot actions end up communicating
to the human, expressing the robot’s internal state.
As of now, we modify the robot’s objective to explicitly
incentivize communication. We are actively working on
making this communication emerge out of the robot
optimizing for its own reward function, but now with
this more sophisticated model of the person – one in
which robot actions affect human beliefs, and human
beliefs are what affect human actions.
A. Humans Expecting Robot Behavior
to Be Approximately Rational
A simple but important inference that people make
when observing other agents is what they expect the
agent’s actions to be. The principle of rational action
[22] suggests that people expect rational agents, such as
robots, to be rational – to maximize their own reward:
PH(uˆR|x0) ∝ eRˆR(x0,uR)
Here, uˆR is the person’s estimate of what the robot’s
action sequence will be, and RˆR is the person’s estimate
of what the robot’s reward function is.
Our work leveraged this to generate plans that match
what people expect. Namely, at a time t, after the person
has observed u0:tR , we can model what they expect the
robot to do next as
PH(uˆRt+1:T |x0, u0:tR ) ∝ exp(RˆR(x0, u0:tR )+ RˆR(xt+1, ut+1:TR ))
The robot can use this model to choose a full time
horizon plan or trajectory such that the beginning of the
plan is informative of the remaining plan, i.e. makes the
remaining plan have high probability:
t-predictability(uR) = PH(uRt+1:T |x0, u0:tR )
u∗R = arg maxuR
t-predictability(uR)
Note that the robot, when interested in its plan being
t-predictable, might purpusefully deviate from the opti-
mum with respect to RˆR in order to make sure that the
remainder of the plan is what the person would predict
after observing t time steps.
Fig.7 shows plans optimized for different t: 0, 1, and 2.
The t = 0 one is the most efficient. The problem is that
after seeing the first step, there are two possible plans
that are relatively efficient, so this plan does not do a
great job collapsing the person’s belief over what will
happen, even after they have seen some of the trajectory.
In contrast, for t = 1, this is no longer the most efficient,
but makes it very clear what the remainder of the plan
will be. [7] details our user studies, both online and
in person, with results suggesting that people have an
easier time coordinating with robots that are more t-
predictable.
Overall, the robot can leverage the person’s expectations
about its actions to make its plans more predictable.
B. Humans Using Robot Behavior
to Infer Robot Internal State
Once people have a model of how the robot will
behave, they can also start using that model to perform
inference about hidden states, like the robot’s goals or
objectives.
Building on [2, 4], we have been exploring Bayesian
Inference as a model of how people infer robot internal
state θR from observed robot actions. This model is
analogous to the algorithms we used in the human
behavior section to enable robots to infer human internal
state from observer human actions:
PH(uR|x0, θR) ∝ exp(RˆR(x0, uR; θR))
b′H(θR) ∝ bH(θR)PH(uR|x0, θR)
The robot can now communicate a θ∗R:
u∗R = arg maxuR
b′H(θ
∗
R)
This is analogous to pragmatics, but the communication
happens through physical behavior and not through
language.
Communicating Robot Goals. In earlier work [6], we
studied a version of this formulation where θR is the
robot’s goal. A manipulator arm decides to exaggerate
its trajectory to the right to convey that the correct goal
is the one on the right and not the one on the left (Fig.8),
and this does lead to participants’ inferring the robot’s
goal faster.
The human inference model when θR is a goal is
one that has been heavily explored in cognitive science
(e.g. [2]), and this work showed what happens when a
robot uses it for communication. The result is analogous
to findings in human-human collaborations about how
people exaggerate their motion to disambiguate their
goal or intention [16].
P(
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R)
left goal right goal
Fig. 8: The robot models the person as running Bayesian Inference to
infer its goal. It chooses to exaggerate its motion to the right to convey
that its goal is the bottle on the right.
Our ability to coordinate with each other relies heavily
on predicting each others’ intentions [16]. Modeling human
inferences about intentions enables robots to purposefully
deviate from efficiency in order to maximally clarify their
intentions.
Communicating Robot Reward Parameters. More re-
cently, we’ve been exploring how θR does not have to
be restricted to a goal. Much like how in Sec. IV we
inferred not just human goals, but also more generally
human reward function parameters, here too the robot
can express not just goals.
In [12], we studied how an autonomous car can plan
behavior that is informative of its reward function. The
car decides to show an environment in which the optimal
trajectory merges closely in front of another car (Fig.9,
left), as opposed to an environment where merging into
a lane away from the other car is optimal (Fig.9, right) –
it finds behavior that is informative about the fact that its
reward is rather aggressive as a driving style, prioritizing
efficiency over safety.
P(
θ 
|u
R1
)
aggressive defensive
uR1 (informative) uR2 (uninformative)
P(
θ 
|u
R2
)
aggressive defensive
Fig. 9: The robot models the person as running Bayesian Inference to
infer its objective parameters θ. It chooses its actions such that they
maximally convey information about θR – in this case that it prioritize
aggressive driving/efficiency over safety.
As robots get more complex, understanding and verifying
their reward functions is going to become more and more
important to end-users. Modeling human inferences about
reward parameters enables robots to choose actions sequences
that are communicative of the true reward parameters.
Communicating Confidence. Even more recently, we
have been exploring spaces of θs beyond even reward
parameters. Robot actions implicitly communicate about
many different aspects of robot internal state. We have
found that people observe robot actions and make attri-
butions about its confidence (Fig.10), or about the weight
of the object that the robot is carrying [24].
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Fig. 10: Different motion timings communicate different levels of robot
confidence.
VI. Discussion
This writeup synthesized our findings in integrat-
ing mathematical models of human state and action
into robot planning of physical behaviors for interactive
tasks. We focused on rational models of human behavior
in a two-player game, showing how different approxima-
tions to the solution lead to different robot behaviors.
A first set of approximations assume that the person
has access to what the robot will do, and the robot
has to the person’s overall reward or utility function.
Still, we found that the robot generates behaviors that
adapt to the person, that guide the person towards better
performance in the task, or that account for the influence
the robot will have on what the person ends up doing.
We saw robots handing over objects to compensate for
people’s tendencies to just grasp them in the most com-
fortable way, and cars being more effective on the road
by triggering responses from other drivers.
More sophisticated approximations accounted for the
fact that different people have different reward functions,
and showed that the robot can actively estimate relevant
parameters online, leading to interesting coordination
behaviors, like cars deciding on trajectories that look like
inching forward at intersections or nudging into lanes to
probe whether another driver will let them through.
Finally, even further approximations acknowledge that
people will need to make predictions about the robot, in
the same way that the robot makes predictions about
people. This leads to robots that are more transparent,
communicating their reward function (e.g. their driving
style) through the way they act.
This work is limited in many ways, including the fact
that as models of people get more complex, it becomes
harder to generate robot behavior in real time (especially
behavior that escapes poor local optima). However, it is
exciting to see the kinds of coordination behaviors that
we typically need to hand-craft starting to emerge out of
low-level planning directly in the robot’s control space. This
requires breaking outside of the typical AI paradigm,
and formally reasoning about people’s internal states
and behavior.
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